Abstract: Presently the Doha Round negotiations for ensuring disciplines in the area of subsidies and countervailing measures are going on at the multilateral level. In particular, a major focus of the current negotiation is on removal of the actionable subsidies being provided in the fishery sector. The current analysis looks into the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures and points out the areas for further reform with reference to the findings on the disputes lodged at the dispute settlement body of the WTO. In addition, the analysis attempts to identify the concern areas for the ongoing fisheries subsides negotiation.
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DOHA ROUND NEGOTIATIONS ON SUBSIDY AND COUNTERVAILING MEASURES
Provision of subsidies to domestic players in order to create price advantage for them is a time-tested practice in international trade. The trade-distorting effects of subsidies have been pointed widely in the literature (Sharp and Sumaila, 2009; Tallontire, 2004; Gooday, 2002; OCEANA, undated) . Hence in recent period international trade governance has been characterised by a progressive regulation on subsidies, tightening disciplines over time in order to avoid such distortions. These rules essentially seek to balance the need for redistribution and implementation of legitimate policy goals and to avoid protectionism and unnecessary distortions of conditions of competition on domestic markets. Trade-restrictive border measures apply to countervail unlawful subsidies but are not at the heart of legal rules relating to this important field of international trade law.
Subsidies consist of specific financial or equivalent benefits to public entities and economic operators. To offset price advantages of imported products, states make specific monetary payments or provide tax relieves to domestic producers, allowing them to lower domestic or export prices and obtain a competitive advantage vis-à-vis competing foreign products. Subsidies exist in different forms (export subsidies, domestic subsidies, production subsidies or decoupled subsidies). Subsidies are specific and different from general payments such as social security to which the public at large or large segments of the population are entitled to. Subsidies are an important instrument in pursuing domestic policy goals and redistribution. At the same time, they exert distorting effects on competition, in particular to the detriment of foreign competitors who generally do not benefit from such measures. 4 On the one side, they can improve the domestic economy, but on the other side, they can distort trade.
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The efforts to address concerns originating from provision of industrial subsidies started quite early as compared to other disciplines. The GATT 1947 Contracting Parties adopted an illustrative list of prohibited export subsidies in 1960 before the Tokyo Round negotiations resulted in the conclusion of a special Code for Subsidies. During the Uruguay Round negotiations, the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) was negotiated. The SCM Agreement 4 Countervailing duties may be imposed after an investigation of a member has led to determine the existence of i) a countervailable subsidy; ii) injury to the domestic industry producing the like product; and iii) a causal link between the subsidised imports and the injury. The striking example of trade distorting subsidies, the upland cotton subsidies granted by US government for local farmers which had more adverse consequences away from its shores. The efforts of rural farmers in developing countries are being undermined by these subsidies. Therefore the fulfillment of obligations by WTO members and further development of subsidies regulation within the WTO framework prevent its Members from the adverse consequences of harmful subsidies. To sum up, the main focus of subsidy regulation, established under the WTO agreements, is to try to control and reduce the trade-distorting effects of subsidies. defines the term 'subsidy' 6 in detail in Article 1. Moreover, it classifies subsidies into three broad categories: i) prohibited; ii) actionable; and iii) non-actionable subsidies. This categorisation is sometimes referred to as a 'traffic light' approach. Prohibited subsidies are 'red light' subsidies which are harmful to trade per se. Non-actionable subsidies are 'green light' subsidies which are considered to be permitted on the grounds of an explicit reference in the legal text. This category unfortunately was applied only for a period of five years beginning with the entry into force of the WTO, since developing countries were afraid it would be excessively used by industrialised countries. Today efforts are under way to put it back, as the category is important for the promotion of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in developing countries as well. Lastly, actionable subsidies are 'yellow light' subsidies which are open to be challenged only if they are considered to cause adverse effects on international trade.
In the recent period, under the Doha Round negotiations the concern over provision of fisheries subsidies has taken a central position, given its implications for the wide number of fishermen in developing countries and LDCs.
The fishery sector provided direct employment to more than 250 million people for their livelihoods during late nineties (Porter, 1997) and the number has increased considerably since then. Nearly 40 per cent of global fishery production is exported, and almost fifty percent of international trade in this category is explained by developing country exports (Dommen and Deere, 1999) . The "Open Access" nature of a significant part of world's marine fisheries and massive state subsidies are cited as the major reason behind overcapitalization of fishing industry. Fisheries subsidies lower the total cost of production, leading to exploitation of fish stocks, particularly in the absence of effective management (Datta and Nilakantan, 2005; UNEP, 2004) .
It is also argued that though fishing access agreements confer economic benefits to the South if effective enforcement and compliance mechanisms are introduced (Atta-Mills et al, 2004) , evidence during nineties did not always provide empirical support to this contention (Milazzo, 1998) . In particular, it has been reported that several of the EU fisheries agreements with West African States during this period were potentially harmful for them, as catch quotas for EU vessels were not specified, which potentially leads to resource overexploitation (Kaczynski and Fluharty, 2002) . Similar overexploitation was observed in case of some other countries as well (Mwikya, 2006; Steenblik and Munro, undated) .
In this background, there is a need to understand to what extent the current multilateral negotiations are going to address the valid concerns of WTO Members. In order to do so, the paper is arranged along the following lines. Section 2 looks into the actual violations of ASCM from the reported / concluded WTO cases. The current trends in Fisheries Subsidies negotiation and the concern for the developing countries are discussed in Section 3. Finally Section 4 draws the conclusions.
II. DATA ANALYSIS
Given the fact that several areas in the ASCM may potentially be misused for protectionist purposes; the current section attempt to analyze the global tendencies towards imposition of these measures.
A.
EXPLORING THE USE / MISUSE SCM MEASURES
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It is observed from Figure 1 that the number of global CVD initiations and CVD measures has shown a fluctuating trend during 1995-2009. The number of CVD initiations exhibited a continuous increasing trend from 1996 to 1999 and was at its peak in 1999 with 41 initiations during that year. Since 1999 however a cyclical pattern is being observed. The scenario improved considerably in 2005, when the number of initiations reached a minimum of 6. However SCM imitations have increased ever since and reached 28 initiations during 2009, which is an area of concern. The imposition of CVD measures has also shown a cyclical pattern. While during 1996-2001 an increasing trend has been observed in CVD measures, an overall decreasing trend was noticed during 2001-2007 with minor fluctuations. However, the number of measures in 2008 increased to 11 and marginally declined to 9 in 2009. In order to understand the SCM imposing behaviour of the major trading countries with respect to each other during the period 1. 1.1995 to 31.12.2009 , Table  1 has been constructed from WTO data. While the countries facing the SCM measures are noted row-wise, the countries initiating the same are reported columnwise. A total of 245 SCM actions have been initiated during this period. United Stated topped the list by accounting for 41.63 percent of the total CVD initiations, followed by the EU (22.04 percent). Interestingly, a significant proportion of the initiations made by the US have taken place against major Asian economies like China (22.55 percent) and India (12.75 percent). On the other hand, only 11 SCM initiations has been undertaken against the US of which 3 were initiated by Canada and China each and 2 by the EU respectively.
A similar trend has been noticed in case of the EU as well. Among the 54 cases initiated, 29.63 percent of the cases have been lodged against India. The other countries suffering from the EU initiations include South Korea (12.96 percent) and Taiwan (11.11 percent) . On the contrary, the EU has faced only 11 initiations on SCM ground against its exports.
India presently tops the list of the countries suffering from the SCM initiations (19.18 percent of the total initiations), followed by China (15.10 percent) and South Korea (6.94 percent). Canada, the EU and the US jointly initiate 72.34 percent of all the SCM initiations against India. However, other developing countries like South Africa have also targeted Indian exports on SCM grounds. On the whole an interesting picture emerges from the analysis; while Canada, the EU and the US account for 73.47 percent of all SCM initiations, China, India and South Korea account for 41.22 percent of the affected cases. If Indonesia and Thailand are also added to the list of the affected developing countries, the corresponding figure reaches 50.20 percent. Clearly the low cost economies of Asia are emerging as the major targets of SCM activism in major developed countries.
The SCM measures are reported in the parenthesis of the same table and a similar conclusion emerges from the analysis. The calculations reveal that Canada, the EU and the US jointly account for 71.94 percent of all SCM measures during the study period. On the other hand among the target economies, China, India and South Korea account for 41.01 percent of the SCM measures.
The finding underlines the need to have a closer analysis of the SCM behaviour of Canada, the EU and the US, which is noted at HS sectional level in Table 2 . Section XV which consists of Base Metals and articles of Base Metals is found to attract most of the SCM initiations for these three players. The triad has jointly initiated 46.67 percent of the total SCM initiations and 30.56 percent of the total measures on this front. The SCM activism for base metals is particularly high in the US. The other major sectors facing SCM challenges in the triad include low-tech products in Section VII (Plastics and articles thereof; Rubber and articles thereof), Section VI (Products of Chemical or allied industries) and Section XI (Textiles and textile articles). However, a relatively sophisticated product group like Machinery and electrical appliances has also been subject to SCM actions. While the EU has adopted several SCM actions on plastic and rubber products and textile products, US actions on chemical products are larger in number.
Table 3 looks at the other side of the coin, i.e., the distribution of the sectors affected by SCM actions in exporting countries. Six entities, namely, Brazil, China, EU, India, Indonesia and South Korea are considered here for the analysis. India has been affected by SCM actions in most serious manner and almost one-third of the initiations against India have been related to Section XV (Base Metal and articles of Base Metal). The other affected sectors include Section VI (Products of Chemical or allied industries) and Section VII (Plastics and articles thereof; Rubber and articles thereof). It is observed from the data that the base metal sector in Brazil, China, Indonesia and South Korea are also suffering heavily from the SCM initiations and measures. Interestingly the EU has faced no SCM initiation or measure against its base metal products. The SCM action on EU exports has instead focused on Section III (Animal or Vegetable Fats and Oils) and Section IV (Prepared Foodstuffs), perhaps in line with the provisions of Common Agricultural Policy. However, all the claims against SCM violation have not been equally successful. For instance, under DS 222 Brazil complained against subsidies granted to Canada's regional aircraft industry, but the panel found the same to be inconsistent with Article 3 of the SCM Agreement only on one count. Similarly, in DS 345 India complained against the amended bond directive and the enhanced bond requirement (EBR) imposed by the US on imports of frozen warmwater shrimp from India. Though the panel found that the US actions are inconsistent with certain provisions of the AD agreement, they were not found to be inconsistent with their obligation under SCM agreement.
The outcome of the SCM complaints lodged at DSB has been analyzed with the help of Table 5 , by placing the cases where SCM violation has been alleged under seven different categories, following the framework devised by Chakraborty and Chaisse (2007) and Chakraborty and Khan (2008) . The first two columns represent 'win' and 'loss' in a particular case. 'Win' by a complainant is defined as its win at the panel level, which remains unchanged even if the appellate body reverses certain legal interpretations of the verdict later, since the existence of a WTO-incompatible policy has been established. However rejection of the claims, both at panel and appellate body level, is termed as 'loss'. The third column considers several possibilities -ongoing cases, cases currently with the appellate body, cases where verdict is expected within a specified time or cases which are not officially closed. The fourth option represents the scenario where the parties jointly request DSB for suspension of proceeding after panel formation, which shows that both sides are willing to negotiate on the alleged measures in force.
Fifth column shows the cases where no panel had been formed, which show mutual discussion, probably leading the respondent to guarantee the desired market access for the complainant to resolve the dispute. Two other possibilities cannot be ruled out in this case. One, a (developed country) complaint might have been raised for harassing the respondent as a trade policy instrument, and two, a (developing country) complainant might have lacked the necessary technical expertise to support his claim, and decided to opt out before formation of the panel. The sixth column notes the cases where a mutually agreeable solution has been notified to the DSB. In the final column the cases where the alleged measure was promptly discontinued after the initial notification at DSB are placed. The last column on one hand indicates the existence of a WTO-incompatible measures in force, and highlights the effectiveness of the dispute settlement mechanism on the other as a credible threat mechanism.
While the top panel of Table 5 represents the global scenario, the bottom panel shows the situation for the US, which has faced maximum number of complaints for violating its obligations from various quarters (i.e., as respondent). It is observed from the top panel that among the 83 cases lodged at the WTO on SCMrelated violations so far, on 30 occasions (36.14 percent) the WTO-incompatibility of the alleged measure has been proved. However in 6 cases, the complaint has been rejected. On 35 occasions (42.17 percent) however, the initial complaint has not been actively pursued, resulting into formation of no panel. Interestingly, unlike the case of ADA, the SCM Agreement has not witnessed any instance of discontinuation of the alleged measure by the respondent.
It is observed from the bottom panel on the US participation that it has lost 11 (42.31 percent of the total cases) cases as respondent, signifying some justification behind the claims of the trade partners. However on 8 cases (30.77 percent) no panel has been formed. Interestingly, no case has been amicably settled or any request for suspending the panel proceedings has ever been submitted to the WTO. This signifies the intensity of the conflict between the US and the partners on SCM ground. It is worth mention that only the US has been able to win a case as respondent four times.
C.
WHICH ARTICLES OF THE SCM AGREEMENT ARE SUSCEPTIBLE TO MISUSE?
In the following the macro analysis conducted in the earlier section has been supplemented with an article-level micro analysis. For that purpose, each individual dispute reported at the WTO involving violations on SCM ground has been analyzed and the number of times a particular provision has been allegedly misused is noted. The alleged violations are reported in Figure 2 .
It is observed from the figure that article 3 (prohibition) of the SCM agreement has allegedly been violated maximum number of times (15.86 percent of the total alleged violations), followed by article 1 (definition of a subsidy) and article 10 (application of article VI of GATT 1994), which account for 10.03 and 9.39 percent of total number of alleged violations respectively. Article 32 (other final provisions) and article 2 (specificity of the subsidy) comes next in terms of alleged violation (6.15 percent). Alleged violations of Article 11 (initiation and subsequent investigation) and article 19 (imposition and collection of countervailing duties) comes in the next layer which have been violated by 5.83 and 5.50 percent respectively. Article 14 (calculation of the amount of a subsidy in terms of the benefit to the recipient), article 5 (trade effects) and article 6 (serious prejudice) witnessed violations in 4.85 percent of the cases.
The other major articles of the SCM agreements which has been allegedly misused includes article 21 (duration and review of countervailing duties and undertakings), article 15 (definition of injury), article 12 (evidence), article 22 (public notice and explanation of determinations), article 17 (provisional measures), article 27 (SDT for developing country Members), article 4 (remedies), article 7 (remedies), article 13 (consultations), article 28 (existing programmes) etc. Among the relatively less controversial areas within the SCM agreement, article 18 (undertakings) and article 16 (definition of domestic industry) have been allegedly violated once twice. Annex V (procedure for developing information concerning serious prejudice), Annex I (illustrative list of export subsidies), article 30 (dispute settlement) and article 20 (retroactivity) have been violated once each.
It is observed from the analysis that almost all the major articles of the SCM agreement have been allegedly violated by both developed and developing countries. In order to identify the areas, where the actual violation of the ASCM occurs, the above methodology is repeated for the completed cases. The cases which have reached the appellate body stage after the defeated party challenged the panel ruling are taken into account for identifying the actual violations. The results of the analysis are reported in Figure 3 .
It is observed from the Figure that actual violations have taken place most frequently (11 times) under article 3.1 (coverage of prohibition), which accounts for 21.15 percent of the total number of violations. The actions of WTO Members have been proved WTO-incompatible under article 1.1 (definition of a subsidy) and article 3.2 (removal of subsidies mentioned under article 1) five times each. Article 5c (serious prejudice) and article 10 (application of article VI of GATT 1994) have been misused in four cases each, while article 14 (calculation of the amount of a subsidy in terms of the benefit to the recipient) has been proved WTO-incompatible three times.
Article 32.5 (implementation and operation of SCM agreement), article 18.4 (undertakings), article 19.1 (amount of the countervailing duties and lesser duty rule) and article 19.4 (non-imposition of duties in excess of the subsidized amount) have been violated twice. However allegations of misuse under article 6.3 (existence of serious prejudice), article 32.1 (imposition of every final action against a Member in accordance with the SCM agreement), article 27.4 (phasing out the export subsidies by a developing country Member over a period of two years after reaching competitiveness), articles 21.1-21.3 (imposition of duties for as long as necessary period), article 20.6 (injury caused by massive import in a relatively short time), articles 17.1 -17.4 (provisional measures), article 15.5 (demonstrating causal link between subsidized imports and actual damage to domestic industry) and article 15.7 (consideration of the factors while determining existence of a threat of material injury) have been proved only under one occasion each. Like the case of initiations, actual violations have also taken place under each and every major provision of the ASCM.
The WTO cases demonstrate that in practice the reason behind seldom applying the provisions on serious prejudice probably lie in its vague legal text. There are still legal elements which are arguable and needs further clarification. There is also no clear threshold for subsidies which causes "serious prejudice".
For example phrases such as "significant" without any clarification and threshold makes these provisions open to interpretation and misuse. But the problem is that it is difficult to fix certain determinants to find serious prejudice because every case on serious prejudice is unique and each such case will have different threshold and determinants to find serious prejudice.
That is why the WTO Members before initiating the "serious prejudice" case should always bear in mind the possible difficulties and obstacles they can face and only after consideration of all pros and cons they should bring the case before the WTO DSB. Moreover it seems that today only developed countries can take advantage from the present legal text on serious prejudice because they can potentially abuse the fact of difficulty for complainant to demonstrate "serious prejudice" (especially for developing countries) and thus can adopt subsidies which could have adverse consequences for international trade.
Probably the replacement of "serious prejudice" concept to simple prejudice would be one of the solutions of this problem. This replacement would simplify the process of proof of the adverse effect caused by subsidies to international trade. In this case the developing countries will gain from such reformation and the result will be the reduction of adverse subsidies and therefore harmonization of international trade.
Thus there is still a room for further development of the concept in order to make the application of serious prejudice provisions easier for complainant party and in order to avoid the abuse by developed WTO Members the fact of inability of developing countries to initiate the case on serious prejudice.
III. A CASE IN POINT: THE CURRENT ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS ON FISHERIES SUBSIDIES
The above discussion brings forward the most important question, whether the present negotiations under the Doha Round are capable of restricting the misuse of SCM measures. Currently the WTO Member countries are engaged in multilateral negotiation so as to limit the usage of actionable subsidies in international trade. Negotiation on disciplining the Fishery subsidies hold a special position in this framework in the sense that a substantial proportion of fishermen in developing countries and LDCs tend to suffer in securing their livelihood, as a result of continuation of high support in other economies. 8 In the following section, it is attempted to see whether the recent negotiations on fishery subsides may positively contribute in its goal.
CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS ON FISHERY SUBSIDY Throughout Nineties several multilateral bodies pointed out the potential dangers of fisheries subsidies. 9 The Doha Development Agenda (2001) noted the need to "clarify and improve WTO disciplines on fisheries subsidies, taking into account the importance of this sector to developing countries", and also acknowledged the relationship of this concern with trade-environment linkage discussion. The need to eliminate subsidies that contribute to illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU) and also lead to creation of over-capacity by the fleets was raised in the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg (2002) though an explicit mention of the same was not included in Johannesburg Declaration.
In line with the concerns raised at Johannesburg, the Ministerial Declaration of the sixth WTO Ministerial Conference at Hong Kong (WTO, 2005) stressed the commitment to enhance mutual cooperation and collaboration on trade and environment, and advocated the need to reach a broad agreement in the fisheries sector, including the prohibition of certain forms of fisheries subsidies that contribute to overcapacity and over-fishing:
"recall our commitment at Doha to enhancing the mutual supportiveness of trade and environment, note that there is broad agreement that the Group should strengthen disciplines on subsidies in the fisheries sector, including through the prohibition of certain forms of fisheries subsidies that contribute to overcapacity and over-fishing, and call on Participants promptly to undertake further detailed work to, inter alia, establish the nature and extent of those disciplines, including transparency and enforceability." (Annex D, para 9). . today, we run the risk that over-fishing will so deplete fish stocks in our oceans that many species will disappear forever.. it is bad news for the world's 43.5 million full time fishers… Governments have contributed to this problem by providing nearly $16 billion annually in subsidies to the fisheries sector. This support keeps more boats on the water and fewer fish in the sea." Source http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl129_e.htm (last accessed on September 10, 2010). In addition, the declaration also underlined the need for ensuring Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) for developing countries and LDCs in line with their development Compulsions: "Appropriate and effective special and differential treatment for developing and least-developed Members should be an integral part of the fisheries subsidies negotiations, taking into account the importance of this sector to development priorities, poverty reduction, and livelihood and food security concerns" (Annex D, para 9).
The discussions initiated by Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration were subsequently supplemented by the negotiations on fisheries subsidies under the Negotiating Group on Rules (NGR). A broad agreement has been reached among the WTO Members on the need to regulate fisheries subsidies and till date several countries have made submissions on this front. The focus of the current negotiations is to identify the subsidies that are considered harmful for the interest of Member countries, especially developing countries and LDCs. Orellana (2008) notes that the current WTO negotiation on fisheries subsidies is a sensitive area.
The text circulated by NGR Chair on 30 November 2007
11 identifies a list of subsidies provided by various countries (Article-1), which are most trade-distorting. The list of these proposed prohibited subsidies is provided in Annex 1. The text also identifies a list of proposed exceptions (Article-2), which might be allowed. The details of the proposed exceptions are mentioned in Annex 2.
The negotiating positions of the WTO Members on the fisheries subsidies issue could be classified under two broad headings. First, a 'Top-down approach' is presently being advocated by the 'Friends of Fish' group. The broad standpoint of the group is that all fisheries subsidies should be prohibited apart from certain exemptions. The proponents of this approach include Argentina, Australia, Chile, Colombia, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Pakistan and the US.
Second, a 'Bottom-up approach' is advocated by another group of countries arguing that all subsidies should be allowed, apart from those that is specifically prohibited. Proponents of this group include Japan, Korea and Taiwan. It can be said that the current position of the EU is located in between (OECD, 2006b) . Despite the differences in the negotiating approach within the two groups, there is a general agreement that subsidies that support capital costs should be prohibited (e.g. the acquisition, modification or construction of fishing vessels). However, it is also important to restrict subsidies provided to operating costs such as fuel, labour etc.
It is increasingly being felt that there is a need to take into account the special development compulsion of the developing countries and LDCs through the use of appropriate and effective SDT. To further this goal, China, India and Indonesia have supported exemptions for developing country small-scale fishermen from subsidies disciplines in terms of infrastructure, capital and operating costs. Interestingly, some developed countries have also requested exemptions for their small-scale fisheries 12 . However, implementation of SDT requires a number of issues to be resolved, including the criteria to be used for identifying eligible fisheries for SDT; territorial limits on the use of SDT; the need for effective management of subsidised fisheries; how access rights for foreign fleets should be treated etc.
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The present negotiation is trying to determine the manner in which the interest of the small fishermen in the developing countries can be ensured. The 'Friends of Fish' group has recognized the need for Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) for the developing countries and LDCs, wanted the flexibility provided to be responsible and appropriate, geared for ensuring a realistic balance. It also wanted that subsidies which are exempted from the prohibition under SDT should otherwise remain actionable under the existing SCM Agreement.
14 The negotiating positions of several developing countries on SDT are that they must provide effective and substantive flexibilities to developing countries, and not remain limited to mere technical support or transitional provisions. One major concern for developing countries like Brazil and China is that the SCM disciplines should not be restricting their freedom to develop their fisheries sector in a sustainable manner:
"In this respect, we see no ground for building exceptions on the basis of parameters such as boat size or the area of capture. The harmful or harmless effect of fisheries subsidies should be all that matters".
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From this perspective, the recent submission by Brazil, China, India and Mexico has tried to draw from the Article 6.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture for this purpose. The idea here is to exclude form of certain subsides from the fold of actionable category:
"On the issue of small-scale, artisanal fisheries, the proponents decided to bring forward a definition based on socio-economic criteria, inspired by the current Article 6.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture. We believe that this is the best way for striking a satisfactory balance, in the absence of internationally-agreed definitions on those fisheries activities by other Organizations more directly involved in fisheries issues. Each Member should be able to work on its own definition, insofar as the criteria set forth in the future WTO disciplines are observed". 16 The negotiating standpoint of the small and vulnerable economies (SVEs) on the other hand has focused on retaining the ability to support their fishery sector on eh basis of the present quantum of trade and financial supports, leading to lower distortion. For instance, Barbados has proposed that the developing countries with a share of world NAMA trade of not more than 0.1 per cent, should be exempt from the prohibition of Article 1.1 a and Article 1.1.c subsidies.
17 On a similar note, the SVE submission has pointed out that:
"The magnitude of subsidies typically provided by SVEs is small and, at this stage in their development, many SVEs are not even in a position to provide subsidies.. SVEs require the necessary policy space to provide subsidies of small magnitudes in the future, to be better equipped to harvest their own resources, within sustainable limits."
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South Korea has expressed displeasure at the current level of negotiations by stressing that they have on one hand not properly addressed the mandates of Hong Kong Ministerial Declarations, and there remain several misunderstandings on the Hong Kong mandate in the Chair's roadmap on the other. The country argued that it is legally inappropriate to make Article 3.1 (prohibited subsidies) of the SCM Agreement a reference point for the entire annex on fisheries subsidies: "The Chair's roadmap, like the draft text, begins with the presumption that all subsidies in the fisheries sector should be prohibited with very limited exceptions. This is manifestly inconsistent with the concepts and principles of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ("SCM Agreement"), which identifies as prohibited only those subsidies that are unarguably harmful and for which a consensus in this regard has long existed in the international community. Designating now a wide range of subsidies as prohibited in the Annex would run the risk of undermining the basic structure and principles of the SCM Agreement."
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The recent US proposal has attempted to modify the Chair's text in some aspects, covering general exemptions, general disciplines and fisheries management. Certain aspects of the US proposals, especially the one covering burden of proof, are expected to help the developing countries: " .. in certain situations harm can be deemed to exist, regardless of whether an affirmative demonstration of evidence of overfishing or overcapacity has been made under IV.2. In Article IV.3, we identify two such situations: (1) there is no valid scientific assessment establishing a sustainable allowable catch for the stock; and (2) the subsidizing Member has not implemented a management plan for the stock that is designed to achieve a sustainable allowable catch throughout the duration of subsidization. In those cases, the burden would shift to the subsidizing Member to demonstrate that the subsidy in question has not caused harm." 20 B.
THE FISHERY SUBSIDY SCENARIO
The extent of subsidization in the fishery sector by the major players over the period 1996-2006 could be observed from the data on Government Financial Transfers (GFTs) obtained from OECD Factbook (2009), which is reported in Table  6 . It is observed from the table that that major subsidizing countries include the developed and advanced developing countries in North America (Canada and the US), Europe (Spain, Norway, Italy, UK, France and Denmark), Asia (Japan, Korea and Turkey) and Australia. While in 1996 the total amount of subsidies provided in these countries stood at US $ 5997.79 million, the figure has increased to US $ 6726.67 million in 2006. However the increase in total fishery sector subsidy in the 12 countries has not witnessed a continuous growth. The volume of total subsidy had declined to US $ 4019.90 million in 1998, which however increased to US $ 5676.34 million in the following year. A decadal peak of US $ 6726.67 million in the subsidy level has been reported in 2006, which is a matter of concern for the developing countries.
It is also observed that the US and Japan are consistently the two major subsidy-providing countries over the period. However, the relative importance of the major subsidy providers has undergone a marked transformation over the last decade. It is observed that in 1996 Japan was the highest subsidy provider in the World. In particular, the subsidy provided by Japan (53 per cent) was greater than the combined volume of subsidies provided by the other eleven countries. The US (15 percent) and Canada (9 percent) were placed at a distant second and third position respectively. In 2006, the US provided maximum amount of subsidy (32 percent), with Japan finishing second close behind (29 percent). It was observed that while the volume of subsidy provided by Japan gradually reduced, on the contrary the same for the US has increased over this period. Other major countries providing substantial volume of GFTs included Korea (11 percent) and Canada (9 percent). The proportional contribution of countries like Australia (1 percent) and the UK (2 percent) in GFTs remained more or less constant.
The detailed break-up on the subsidies provided by the major countries are reported from OECD (2006), which is available for four major categories, namely: (1) direct payments, (2) cost reducing transfers, (3) general services and (4) cost recovery charges over the period of 1996-2003. The contribution of these components in the overall subsidy level over this period for select countries is reported in It is a long standing allegation of the developing countries that the subsidies provided by several developed countries distort competition by lowering production costs for their fishery sector, thereby giving them an artificial competitive advantage. In particular, these practices may drive out producers from the developing countries / LDCs. In other words, the exporters from the subsidy recipient countries may enhance their global market share at the expense of unsubsidized competitors.
Measures of revealed comparative advantage (RCA) could be of use here to assess this contention. The RCA indicates whether a country is in the process of expanding exports of the products in which it has a trade potential, as opposed to situations in which the number of products that can be competitively exported is static. The RCA index of country i for product j is often measured by the product's share in the country's exports in relation to its share in world trade by the following formula: of product j and and refer to the country i's total exports and world's total exports. A value of less than unity implies that the country has a revealed comparative disadvantage in the product. Similarly, if the index exceeds unity, the country is said to have a revealed comparative advantage in the product. The current study first determines the RCA trends for all fishery exports at HS 6-digit level for the 12 major subsidy providing countries as noted in Table 6 and India as a developing country for the years 2000, 2004 and 2008 . The data is obtained from the WITS database. In Table 8 , the proportion of HS tariff lines for the fishery sector (i.e., within HS 3) with the RCA greater than 1 has been reported. It is observed from the table that barring the exception of Australia and Denmark the share of tariff lines with RCA greater than one has increased over 2000 to 2008. In other words, relative exports of fishery sector products have increased from these countries. On the other hand, the same has gone down for India and South Korea over the same period. Though the findings in strict sense do not indicate a one-to-one correspondence between subsidies in the developed countries and RCA decline in developing countries like India, it stresses the requirement to urgently conclude the ongoing negotiation on fishery subsidies for greater discipline.
D. WILL THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS SOLVE THE FISHERY SUBSIDY PROBLEMS?
In order to understand the effectiveness of the current negotiation, the current study attempted to look at the subsidy provided by various countries. It is however observed that a long standing problem in the field of fishery subsidy is that of widespread discrepancies of the data available with various multilateral / international agencies. For instance, Japan in 1996 reported to the WTO that it has provided US $ 5 billion as subsidies for tax preference programs under fisheries, but the same was not included in either of its reported data to the OECD or APEC. Milazzo (1998) reported that while China was annually providing around US $ 700-800 million to this sector, it officially reported only US $ 50 million subsidy in its reported statistics to APEC. The OECD (2006a) study, for the US on the other hand did not report the federal subsidy program on fishing access payments or some state subsidies. A similar underreporting in case of fuel subsidies is also widely reported in the literature (Khan et al, 2006; Sumaila et al, 2008) . Also the fisheries subsidies data reporting system by various countries is substantially different, which makes comparison across categories difficult (WWF, 2001; Chakraborty and Kumar, 2010) .
Therefore in order to compare the fishery sector subsidy data for the major subsidizing countries from an authentic single source, the data reported by OECD (2006a, 2009) has been considered, which has been reported in Table 6 and 7 earlier. The problem however is that OECD database (2006a) does not report the subsidy data for the covered countries in terms of Article 1 and Article 2 subsidies. The reporting on fishery subsidy is rather done under some broader categories like 'direct payments', 'cost reducing transfers', 'general services' and 'cost recovery charges'. The constituents of the four categories, as explained by OECD, are reported in Annex 3. The first three of these four categories are considered in the current context. Detailed breakups of subsidy data is however not available even for the OECD countries in the most recent reported source (OECD, 2009), which provides data over 1996-2006. Moreover even for the OECD countries the detailed break-up data are available only for the period of 1996 to 2003 (OECD, 2006a .
In order to understand the challenge posed by the data availability problem, a concordance between the WTO classification of subsidies (Article 1 and Article 2) and the OECD classification of subsidies (direct payments, cost reducing transfers and general services) is attempted by the current study on the basis of the definitions. The generated concordance has been reported in Table 8 .
Though the concordance provides a clearer perspective on the classification of the actionable / non-actionable subsidies, the data problem still remains owing to overlap of reported subsidies between the categories. For instance, 'direct payments' under the OECD classification includes both 'price support payments to fishers' and 'disaster relief payments'. While the former is an Article 1 type subsidy, the latter falls under Article 2 category.
Similarly under 'cost reducing transfers', 'fuel tax exemptions' and 'government funded training of fish processing workers' could be classified under Article 1 and Article 2 subsidies respectively.
Finally, looking at the 'general services' category, it is observed that while entries like 'support to build port facilities for commercial fishers' distort production and trade and hence comes under Article 1, other categories such as 'grants to local authorities for retraining of fishers into other activities' create the opposite effect and are placed under Article 2.
Though arriving at a definitive conclusion on Article 1 / Article 2 subsidies prevailing in developed countries is not possible due to the reported overlap; judging by the concentration of subsidy categories under various heads, it could be noted that Article 1 subsidies are broadly falling under 'direct payments' and 'cost reducing transfers'. However, it is to be noted that several Article 2 subsidies are also included in these two categories. On the other hand, the exemptions (Article 2) are mostly concentrated under 'general services' category, despite having some Article 1 subsidies included within that group.
It has already been shown under section 3.3 that the use of SCM articles which have been used in a WTO-inconsistent manner includes article 3.1 (coverage of prohibition) and article 1.1 (definition of a subsidy). Clearly the present scenario on fisheries data transparency is not enough for preventing further misuse of these ASCM provisions for fishery products.
IV. IN LIEU OF CONCLUSION
The number of cases in international trade practice demonstrated that the consequences of granting of subsidies by a government could have serious adverse effect on international trade. This situation demonstrates the necessity to improve the regulation of subsidies at the international level. Despite the fact that it passed more than half a century since trading countries started negotiations on subsidies issue in order to regulate them it seems they still have a room for further development. The current study after analysis of the relevant issues arrives at the two following conclusions.
First, the discussion of the completed disputes on ASCM indicates that several major provisions of the agreement have been liberally misused by WTO Members. Therefore the current negotiation on rules should attempt to prevent such misuse through relevant modification of the ASCM text.
Second, it is obvious from the current discussion that fisheries subsidy in several countries pose a serious problem in ensuring multilateral discipline in the area of subsidies. The experience of Agreement on Agriculture shows that, even the straight-jacketed classification of subsides in amber, blue and green boxes could not entirely tackle the continuation of harmful subsidization of primary products in several countries after fifteen years since inception of WTO. Cotton subsidy in US for instance is a classic case in point here.
In this background, the potential problems associated with the current nontransparency in the fisheries subsidy-reporting mechanism, leading to overlapping of Article 1 and Article 2 subsidies as observed from the OECD reported categories, poses a serious threat to multilateral trade regime. Hence the negotiating standpoint of the developing countries at the forthcoming WTO forums should focus primarily on ensuring greater transparency and harmonization in fisheries subsidy data reporting. The negotiations should also ensure that disciplines emerging from such negotiations are able to reign in the high levels of subsidies prevailing in the developed countries, but do not curtail the flexibility of developing countries to extend subsidy in order to improve the lot of the resource poor fisherman community whose livelihood sustenance depends upon fishing activity. • Articles 1, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 22 The Panel ruled that -• Policy Order 8, Decree 125 and Announcement 4 are inconsistent with Article III:2, first sentence of the GATT 1994 in that they subject imported auto parts to an internal charge in excess of that applied to like domestic auto parts
• Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the TRIMs Agreement in conjunction with paragraphs 1(a) and 2(a) of the Illustrative List annexed to the Agreement.
• Article 3 of the SCM Agreement.
• China's obligations under its Access Protocol, in particular Part I, para. 7.3 of the Accession Protocol, and in para. 203 of the Working Party Report on the Accession of China (WP Report) in conjunction with Part I, para. 1.2 of the Accession Protocol, and para. 342 of the WP Report.
• • Regarding Korea's claim under Article 32.1 of the SCM Agreement, although the measures at issue were "specific" within the meaning of that provision as interpreted by the Appellate Body, the measures at issue did not constitute action "against" a subsidy of another member as that term has been interpreted by the Appellate Body.
• Regarding Korea's claim under Article 23.1 of the DSU, the Panel found that the EC had adopted the TDM mechanism in response to what it considered to be a violation by Korea of its obligations under the SCM Agreement and that the Communities was seeking to induce Korea to remove its allegedly WTO-inconsistent
• Articles I:1 and III:4 of GATT 1994;
• Article 23 (1) and (2) , 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.7, 3.8, 12 and 18 .1 of the ADA • Articles 10, 15.1, 15.2, 15.3, 15.4, 15.5, 15.7, 15.8, 22 and (c) Subsidies the benefits of which are conferred on operating costs of fishing or service vessels (including licence fees or similar charges, fuel, ice, bait, personnel, social charges, insurance, gear, and at-sea support); or of landing, handling or in-or near-port processing activities for products of marine wild capture fishing; or subsidies to cover operating losses of such vessels or activities.
(d) Subsidies in respect of, or in the form of, port infrastructure or other physical port facilities exclusively or predominantly for activities related to marine wild capture 22 Subsidies referred to in this provision shall not be prohibited when limited to the relief of a particular natural disaster, provided that the subsidies are directly related to the effects of that disaster, are limited to the affected geographic area, are time-limited, and in the case of reconstruction subsidies, only restore the affected area, the affected fishery, and/or the affected fleet to its pre-disaster state, up to a sustainable level of fishing capacity as established through a science-based assessment of the post-disaster status of the fishery. Any such subsidies are subject to the provisions of Article VI.
23
For the purposes of this Agreement, the term "fishing vessels" refers to vessels used for marine wild capture fishing and/or on-board processing of the products thereof.
24
For the purposes of this Agreement, the term "service vessels" refers to vessels used to tranship the products of marine wild capture fishing from fishing vessels to on-shore facilities; and vessels used for at-sea refuelling, provisioning and other servicing of fishing vessels.
fishing (for example, fish landing facilities, fish storage facilities, and in-or near-port fish processing facilities).
(e) Income support for natural or legal persons engaged in marine wild capture fishing.
(f) Price support for products of marine wild capture fishing.
(g) Subsidies arising from the further transfer, by a payer Member government, of access rights that it has acquired from another Member government to fisheries within the jurisdiction of such other Member. Government-to-government payments for access to marine fisheries shall not be deemed to be subsidies within the meaning of this Agreement.
26
The terms "illegal fishing", "unreported fishing" and "unregulated fishing" shall have the same meaning as in paragraph 3 of the International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal Unreported and Unregulated Fishing of the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization.
ANNEX 2: GENERAL EXCEPTIONS (ARTICLE 2 SUBSIDIES IN ANNEX VIII)
Notwithstanding the provisions of Article I, and subject to the provision of Article V:
(a) For the purposes of Article I.1(a), subsidies exclusively for improving fishing or service vessel and crew safety shall not be prohibited, provided that:
(1) such subsidies do not involve new vessel construction or vessel acquisition;
(2) such subsidies do not give rise to any increase in marine wild capture fishing capacity of any fishing or service vessel, on the basis of gross tonnage, volume of fish hold, engine power, or on any other basis, and do not have the effect of maintaining in operation any such vessel that otherwise would be withdrawn; and (c) For the purposes of Article I.1(c), subsidies to cover personnel costs shall not be interpreted as including:
(1) subsidies exclusively for re-education, retraining or redeployment of fishworkers 27 into occupations unrelated to marine wild capture fishing or directly associated activities; and (2) subsidies exclusively for early retirement or permanent cessation of employment of fishworkers as a result of government policies to reduce marine wild capture fishing capacity or effort.
(d) Nothing in Article I shall prevent subsidies for vessel decommissioning or capacity reduction programmes, provided that:
(1) the vessels subject to such programmes are scrapped or otherwise permanently and effectively prevented from being used for fishing anywhere in the world;
(2) the fish harvesting rights associated with such vessels, whether they are permits, licences, fish quotas or any other form of harvesting rights, are permanently revoked and may not be reassigned;
(3) the owners of such vessels, and the holders of such fish harvesting rights, are required to relinquish any claim associated with such vessels and harvesting rights that could qualify such owners and holders for any present or future harvesting rights in such fisheries; and (4) the fisheries management system in place includes management control measures and enforcement mechanisms designed to prevent overfishing in the targeted fishery. Such fishery-specific measures may include limited entry systems, catch quotas, limits on fishing effort or allocation of exclusive quotas to vessels, individuals and/or groups, such as individual transferable quotas.
(e) Nothing in Article I shall prevent governments from making user-specific allocations to individuals and groups under limited access privileges and other exclusive quota programmes.
Source: WTO (2007) 27 For the purpose of this Agreement, the term "fishworker" shall refer to an individual employed in marine wild capture fishing and/or directly associated activities.
